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Unemployment and Welfare Participation in a Structural VAR: 






The Council of Economic Advisers (1997) started a large research effort about 
the relationship between the US unemployment rate and the welfare 
participation rate, with special regard to the 1990s. In this paper, this 
relationship is examined in a structural VAR over the period of 1960-2000. It is 
found that the unemployment rate does not Granger-cause the welfare 
participation rate, while the converse is true. Moreover, a negative shock to the 
welfare participation rate predicts a reduction in the unemployment rate. These 
results are robust to State and year heterogeneity over the period of 1990-1998. 
A first implication is that - contrarily to the majority view - the decline of the 
welfare participation rate in the last decade should be mainly attributed to 
restrictive welfare reforms, not to the fall in the unemployment rate. Further, 
the political choice to reduce the welfare participation rate may have inflated 
the reduction in the unemployment rate. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this paper can be thought as twofold. First, it is argued that the decline in the 
welfare participation rate in the United States in the 1990s should be mainly attributed to 
restrictive welfare reforms, not to the decline in the unemployment rate. Second, it is 
argued that the political choice to reduce the welfare participation rate - implementing 
restrictive welfare reforms - may have inflated the fall in the unemployment rate in the 
1990s.  
The paper has the following structure. Section 2  is reviewing the literature on the welfare 
reforms occurred in the United States during the last decade. Since a 1997 report by the 
Council of Economic Advisers (hereinafter CEA), there has been an increasing interest on 
the relationship between the unemployment rate and the welfare participation rate. 
Research has analyzed this relationship from a micro-econometric point of view using 
panel data. A macro-econometric perspective has not received attention yet. This paper 
takes the latter perspective using aggregate time-series data. Sections 3 to 5 present an 
empirical analysis based on a structural VAR model. The analysis is aimed to contribute to 
explain what happened in the 1990s, when the welfare participation rate and the 
unemployment rate manifested a strong positive association. Section 6 inspects for 
robustness of VAR results with respect to State and year heterogeneity over the last decade, 
using panel data. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the main implications of the stylized facts arising 
from the VAR analysis. Section 9 concludes the article. A short Appendix provides some 
further details on the main empirical model of this study. 
 
 
2. A summary of the literature  
 
2.1 Welfare policy in the 1990s 
During the 1990s, the United States deeply reformed their most important welfare 
program, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereinafter AFDC). The reforms 
led to the end of the program in August 1996. The AFDC was created in 1935 with the 
Social Security Act (Title IV) in order to provide financial assistance to needy children, 
being fatherless or motherless (typically fatherless; the original name of the program was 
Aid to Dependent Children). At the beginning of the 1990s, the AFDC provided both cash 
and in-kind assistance to needy (income below a certain level) families with dependent 
children. Typical recipients were either single parents - often mothers - and their dependent 
children (AFDC-Basic) or unemployed parents in two parent-families and their dependent 
children (AFDC-Unemployed Parent).  
The AFDC program was implemented by the States. Activities of each State were subject 
to the approval of the Government, which financed State expenditures in a share ranging 
from 50% to 80% (matching grant). The Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) was in charge to control whether State activities were consistent with the AFDC 
law. However, since 1962, the DHHS could waive law requirements in order to allow 
States to carry out special policies. The actual use of waivers started in the 1980s but it only 
became a common practice in the first half of the 1990s. Indeed, from 1993 to 1996, 
President Clinton awarded a federal waiver to 43 States. As well known, States receiving 
waivers deeply changed the nature of the AFDC program by introducing time limits to aid 
and family caps, by reducing exemptions to participation in mandatory activities (either 
work or training), by enhancing sanctions (CEA, 1997).  
In August 1996 the welfare reforms, begun at State level, were completed at federal level by  
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the approval of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA). The act replaced the AFDC by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF). The federal guarantee of assistance to needy families with children disappeared.  
States received great discretion in defining their own programs, which became strongly 
work-oriented. States had to bring people from welfare to work, but they were given a 
Machiavellian out (Edelman, 1997). Indeed, the new law allowed States to reach targeted 
shares of working caseloads over total caseloads by simply expelling non-working 
caseloads. Those policies begun with the waivers were strengthened: for instance, time 
limits. People having spent 5 years (cumulated) in welfare assistance lost eligibility for aid. 
This lifetime limit interested half of caseloads in 1997 from close up (Edelman, 1997). In 
addition, the monthly AFDC subsidy per family decreased a lot in the 1990s reaching a new 
historical negative record every new year (US Department of Health and Human Services, 
2003).  
All in all, the last decade dated several restrictive reforms, but it was not only a period of 
social retrenchments since policies helping low-income people were implemented too. 
Examples are the increase in the AFDC earnings disregard, the increase in the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the increase in the minimum wage. All these policies were 
work-oriented on the lines of the welfare policies of the 1990s. Indeed, they all shared a 
common feature: they only helped the poor holding a job. 
      
2.2 Caseload studies 
A report by the CEA (1997) has started a large research effort about the welfare reforms in 
the United States in the 1990s, reviewed by Blank (2002) and Moffitt (2002). The welfare 
participation rate, i.e. the share of population receiving AFDC-TANF, has declined since a 
peak in 1994 (Figure 1). The decline is consequence of a drastic reduction in the total 
number of caseloads, decreased from 14.2 millions in 1993 to 5.7 millions in 2000. A large 
part of the literature has focused on explaining why the welfare participation rate declined. 
The CEA (1997), for instance, argues that the share of population on public assistance has 
declined both because of the strong economy and because of welfare reforms. From 1993 
to 1996, about 31-45% of the decline can be attributed to the decrease in the 
unemployment rate (Figure 1). About 13-31% of the decline can be attributed to the 
federal waivers. Similar results can be found in Levine and Whitmore (1998), Wallace and 
Blank (1999), and Blank (2001). In contrast with the CEA (1997), Ziliak et al. (1997; 2000) 
argue that almost all of the decline in the welfare participation rate can be attributed to 
improved economic conditions in the States, and nothing to the waivers. In absence of 
economic factors, there would not have been any decline in the share of population on 
welfare rolls. Similar results are in Figlio and Ziliak (1999) and Bartik and Eberts (1999). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
In 1999 the CEA extends its previous analysis taking the effects of the 1996 welfare reform 
(PRWORA) into account. The new report (CEA, 1999) maintains that 35-36% of the 
decline in the welfare participation rate is due to the introduction of the TANF. Improved 
labor market conditions only explain 8-10% of the decline, much less than during the 
period of 1993-1996 (26-36% in the revisited estimates for the period of 1993-1996). 
Hence, TANF has affected per-capita caseloads more than waivers (12-15% in the revised 
estimates for 1993-1996), while the unemployment rate in post-TANF period has affected 
per-capita caseloads less.  
Some studies have analyzed the impact on economic and political factors on the use of  
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welfare (dummy variable), instead than on the welfare participation rate (per-capita 
caseloads). For instance, Grogger (2001) argues that the fall in the unemployment rate has 
reduced the welfare use less than welfare reforms, while O’Neill and Hill (2001) maintain 
that this conclusion holds for TANF, but not for waivers.  
As stressed by Bell (2001), there is a substantial agreement in the literature on the argument 
that the fall in the unemployment rate in the 1990s has contributed to the fall in the welfare 
participation rate and the welfare use. There is less agreement on contributions of waivers 
and TANF. In addition, while literature has made an effort to distinguish among various 
components of the welfare reform (for example, between the effects of family caps, time 
limits, work requirements, earnings disregard), there are not significant common results. 
Sometimes there are unexpected results: for instance the CEA (1999) finds that family caps 
have increased per-capita caseloads; and Ziliak et al. (2000) have the same result for work-
incentive waivers (enhanced earnings disregard). Sometimes results are more expected: for 
instance Grogger (2000; 2001) finds that time limits have decreased welfare use. 
A common denominator of the literature is the lack of agreement on how to specify the 
estimated models from a dynamic point of view. The variability of interpretations, which is 
considered a key factor in explaining the variability of results on the effect of policies, is 
primarily due to the absence of a unitary theoretical framework explaining movements in 
the stock of per-capita caseloads. Klerman and Haider (2004) have even argued that the all 
models having the stock of per-capita caseloads as dependent variable are misspecified as 
containing a null or non-sufficient number of lags of the explanatory variables (including 
the unemployment rate). Due to the shortness of the available panel data, these authors 
suggest a new procedure (called ‘stock-flow’ approach) to study the stock of per-capita 
caseloads, which avoids need of many lagged regressors. Unfortunately, they use data on 
caseload flows which are not available at national level. Indeed, they use data from 
California and, therefore, their results are not necessarily valid at national level. 
 
2.3 Welfare-to-work studies 
A part of the literature has analyzed the effect of welfare reforms on labor market 
outcomes such as labor force participation, employment, and earnings. Research has 
specially focused on less-educated women, single mothers or female-headed families, i.e. 
typical adults or families on welfare assistance. Moffitt (1999), for instance, finds that 
waivers have increased hours and weeks of work for less-educated women, but without 
increasing their weekly salaries or annual earnings. Schoeni and Blank (2000) have a more 
positive view of the welfare reforms, arguing that the reforms have reduced people 
dependence on welfare, increased earnings and reduced poverty in families with less-
educated women (the benefits of the 1996 reform seem less diffused than those deriving 
from waivers).  
Some studies have dealt with the combined effect of various policy changes. For instance, 
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) discuss changes in fiscal and social policies related to single 
mothers, such as increased EITC, reduced welfare benefits, re-defined job-training 
programs and increased Medicaid. Single mothers have registered a rise in both weekly-
hours of work and employment rate, a rise not found in other low-wage groups and among 
single women without children. The authors attribute the increase in labor activity of single 
mothers mainly to the increased EITC. They find less evidence that reduced welfare 
benefits have affected labor activity of single mothers. Similar results are in Blank et al. 
(2000). Instead, Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) show that States using waivers, particularly 
family caps and time limits, have registered significant increases in work-hours of less 
educated single mothers. Grogger (2001) finds positive effects on labor activity of single  
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mothers of both EITC and welfare reforms, particularly time limits. However, Ellwood 
(2000) suggests caution as the effects of reforms are hardly separable from those of EITC 
and economic expansion.  
Finally, leavers’ studies have shown that most of former adult recipients hold a job at some 
observation in the first years following welfare exit. For instance, Martinson (2000) finds 
that only 20% of leavers has never worked in the first four years following welfare exit. 
Salaries of leavers, however, are either low or very low (between 5.50 and 8.50 dollars per 
hour).    
 
2.4 A summing up 
Our summary helps to stress that research on welfare reforms has focused on three main 
issues: 
1.  to what extent the fall in the unemployment rate since its 1992 peak has affected 
the fall in the welfare participation rate since its 1994 peak (caseload studies); 
2.  to what extent the welfare reforms since 1993 reduced the welfare participation rate 
(caseload studies); 
3.  to what extent the welfare reforms affected the reduction in the unemployment 
rate, by affecting both labor force and employment (welfare-to-work studies). 
In a general scenario, not strictly related to the 1990s, reviewed literature seems to raise two 
important questions:  
•  whether the unemployment rate helps to predict the welfare participation rate; if so, 
how an exogenous shock to the unemployment rate affects the welfare 
participation rate (see point 1, and indirectly point 2);  
•  whether the welfare participation rate helps to predict the unemployment rate; if so, 
how an exogenous shock to the welfare participation rate affects the 
unemployment rate (see point 3, and indirectly point 2). 
Focusing on the 1990s, these two questions remain relevant. Indeed, over the last decade, 
one might argue that the United States experienced a number of negative shocks to the 
unemployment rate, due to information revolution and investment recovery, and a number 
of negative shocks to the welfare participation rate, due to the welfare reforms. This paper 
is aimed to answer the two questions of above by examining the relationship between the 





The reviewed literature is based on panel data and on micro-econometric tools. For 
instance, the CEA (1997) uses State administrative data from 1976 to 1996, provided by the 
US Department of Health and Human Services and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In a 
second report, the CEA (1999) extends this sample up to 1998. Ziliak et al. (1997; 2000) 
use monthly observations from 1986 to 1996. A different approach is taken by Moffitt 
(1999) who uses individual data for the period of 1977-1995 from March Current 
Population Survey. Schoeni and Blank (2000) use the same source as Moffitt (1999), but 
extending the sample up to 1999. Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) also use the same source, 
but focusing on the period of 1995-1999. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) focus, instead, on 
the period of 1984-1997.  
Due to a micro-econometric approach, existing research has not yet analyzed the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the welfare participation rate from a 
macro-econometric point of view. One reason of performing a macro-econometric analysis  
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is the agreement in the literature on the argument that the reduction in the welfare 
participation rate was mainly due to the decline in the unemployment rate (Bell, 2001). 
Although a positive influence of the unemployment rate on the welfare participation rate 
may appear clear when considering the existence of the AFDC-Unemployed Parent 
program since 1961, it seems unclear when looking at national-level data. As Figure 1 
shows, a decline (increase) in the unemployment rate is not necessarily associated with a 
decline (increase) in the welfare participation rate, although the two variables are positively 
correlated (r = 0.49, p-value = 0.001). Hence, a deeper analysis seems useful.  
The main empirical analysis in this paper is based on annual data for the period of 1960-
2000 (Figure 1). Data prior to 1960 are not used as the AFDC program was still Aid to 
Dependent Children, and the share of adults on the rolls was minimal. As Table 1 suggests 
(ERS and KPSS tests), both the welfare participation rate and the unemployment rate can 
be treated as stationary series. Hence, non-transformed data are used in the empirical 
model.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
 
4. Structural model 
 
The main argument behind the empirical model in this paper is the following. As seen in 
Section 2, existing studies can be divided in two groups. The first group of studies has 
discussed the influence of the unemployment rate U on the welfare participation rate B 
(caseload studies)
1. The second group of studies has discussed the influence of the welfare 
reforms on employment and labor force (welfare-to-work studies)
2. If a political choice to 
modify the share of population on welfare assistance may affect employment and labor 
force, then the second group of studies has indirectly discussed the influence of B on U. 
This paper puts together the first group of studies (those directly discussing the influence 
of U on B) and the second group of studies (those indirectly discussing the influence of B 
on U) in assuming that the relationship between U and B can be summarized by the 























It is implicit that this model is strictly aimed to provide the simplest macro-econometric 
framework for the relationship between U and B, arising from the literature (see also 
Appendix). The structural shock in equation (2) is an exogenous shock to the national 
welfare participation rate. For this reason, we can interpret it as a federal political choice to 
modify the share of population on welfare assistance. Analogously, the structural shock in 
equation (1) is an exogenous shock to the unemployment rate.  
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matrix for i = 1,…, p. 
To simplify notation, the model can be re-written in the following form: 
(4)  ∑
=
− + Φ + Φ =
p
1 i
t i t i 0 t v y y 




− − =  and  ) ' e e ( E t t  is a diagonal matrix. 
Structural decomposition is based on a Sims-Bernanke procedure as described by Enders 
(1995, pp. 324-327). Identification is Cholesky-type with the welfare participation rate 
ordered last. Therefore, it is assumed that a shock to the welfare participation rate does not 
have an immediate effect on the unemployment rate while the converse is true. This 
assumption is consistent with the existing literature that primarily stresses the influence of 
the unemployment rate on the welfare participation rate (Bell, 2001). However, our 
impulse-response functions (IRFs) are highly robust to a different ordering and to a 
generalized approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1998).  
 
 
5. Stylized facts 
 
The order of the VAR is chosen using the maximum likelihood ratio test. The best model 
has order p = 2  since the null hypothesis of  0 2 = Φ  is rejected. Akaike and Schwarz 
criteria confirm this choice. Therefore, the dynamic specification of the estimated model 
(the number of lags) is not arbitrarily chosen. This is a way to deal with the dynamic 
specification puzzle of existing research, described in Section 2 (Bell, 2001; Klerman and 
Haider, 2004). 
Equation (4) with order p = 2 is named Model 1. It is estimated by Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) and the results are presented in the columns (a)-(b) of Table 2. Fitted series are 
plotted in Figure 1, Granger-causality tests are in Table 3, while Figures 2-3 contain IRFs. 
Following Christiano et al. (1996), we use the VAR approach to derive stylized facts. 
Specifically, our analysis suggests the following two facts: 
 
Table 2 here 
Table 3 here 
Figure 2 here 
Figure 3 here 
 
1.  The unemployment rate (U) does not Granger-cause the welfare participation rate 
(B). In the short-run, it is doubtful whether a shock reducing (increasing) U 
predicts a reduction (increase) in B (see confidence interval). The accumulated 
response of B to U converges to a neighborhood of zero. 
2.  The welfare participation rate does Granger-cause the unemployment rate (at 10% 
level). In the short-run, a shock reducing (increasing) B predicts a reduction 
(increase) in U. The accumulated response of U to a negative (positive) shock to B 
converges to a negative (positive) number. 
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The above implies - among other things - that the unemployment rate significantly 
responds to a permanent shock to the national welfare participation rate (like a federal 
welfare reform), while the converse is not true. 
 
6. How well our stylized facts fit the 1990s? A panel VAR analysis 
 
It is of interest to inspect whether results of Model 1 are robust to State and year 
heterogeneity over the 1990s. To do this, it is useful writing Model 1 in its following 
reduced-form:  
 
(5)  t 2 t 2 1 t 1 2 t 2 1 t 1 U t residU B B U U C U + δ + δ + φ + φ + = − − − −  
 
(6)  t 2 t 2 1 t 1 2 t 2 1 t 1 B t residB U U B B C B + θ + θ + η + η + = − − − −  
 
where, clearly,  Ut t V residU =  and  Bt t V residB = . Therefore, a natural step onward is to 
carry on estimating a Panel-VAR model in the following reduced-form (Arellano, 2003, p. 
117): 
 
(7)  st 2 st 2 1 st 1 2 st 2 1 st 1 t s st residU B B U U u u U + δ + δ + φ + φ + + = − − − −  
 
(8)  st 2 st 2 1 st 1 2 st 2 1 st 1 t s st residB U U B B b b B + θ + θ + η + η + + = − − − −  
    
where  s u a n d   s b  contain State specific effects, while  t u a n d   t b  contain year effects. 
Equations (7)-(8) are named Model 2. 
In order to assess whether results of Model 1 can be specifically associated with the 1990s, 
Model 2 is estimated - using annual State-level data from the CEA (1999) - over the sample 
period of 1990-1998. Particularly, Model 2 is estimated by Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM).  
Before presenting estimation results, it is of interest to inspect data persistency. Following 
Blundell and Bond (2000), we estimate several AR(1) processes for each series
3 using OLS, 
Fixed Effects (FE) as well as GMM. The latter method uses as instruments all available 
lags of unemployment or welfare participation up to t–2. This allows to assess whether to 
worry about presence of weak instruments due to highly persistent series.  
Table 4 shows that, for the welfare participation rate, two-step difference-GMM (say 
GMM2 DIFF; see Arellano and Bond, 1991) performs poorly due to weak instruments. 
Indeed, the estimated coefficient is lower than the one from FE which is based downward 
in presence of State effects. However, two-step system-GMM (say GMM2 SYS; see 
Blundell and Bond, 1998) does not work better due to second order auto-correlated 
residuals (this problem cannot be solved by reducing the number of instruments). Indeed, 
the estimated coefficient is higher than the one from OLS which is based upward in 
presence of State effects. This suggests to choose the appropriate GMM estimator for 
Model 2 by using the Hansen difference test, which in turn suggests to estimate Model 2 
by GMM2 SYS (see Table 2).  
 
Table 4 here 
 
Estimation results for Model 2 are presented in Tables 2-3. We begin using as instruments 
all available lags of unemployment and welfare participation up to t–2. A non-singular  
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instrument matrix is obtained by ‘collapsing’ the number of instruments
4 (Roodman, 
2004a; 2004b). Nevertheless our procedure fails when B is treated as dependent variable 
(equation (8)) since residuals are found to be second order auto-correlated. Instead, Model 
2 looks suitable for B when using as instruments all lags up to t–3 (Blundell and Bond, 
2000, p. 332).  
Although not reported, OLS estimates of equation (8) in Model 2 - which are consistent in 
absence of State heterogeneity - are not closed to GMM2 SYS estimates of equation (8), 
suggesting that State specific effects mattered. The latter is less likely for equation (7), 
whose reported estimates are closed to those obtained by OLS (see also the AR(1) 
estimates for the unemployment rate in Table 4). Finally, year dummies are jointly 
significant in both equation (7) and (8).  
All in all, results of Model 2 support those from Model 1. Therefore we carry on 
discussing the implications of the stylized facts in Section 5, focusing on the last decade. 
 
 
7. Has the fall in the unemployment rate caused the fall in the welfare 
participation rate?  
 
Our first stylized fact (Section 5) is at odds with the findings of several caseload studies 
(Section 2). An explanation for this surprising result is that quoted studies have focused on 
the effect of U on B without modeling the interaction between U and B, instead captured 
by a VAR analysis. Another explanation may be related to sample differences as described 
in Section 3 and Section 6.  
Our result does not support the idea that the decline in the unemployment rate has 
somehow led the decline in the welfare participation rate in the 1990s. This is consistent 
with the fact that the UP recipients, those more directly affected by the level of 
unemployment, have never been more than 12% of total recipients, with an average of 8%. 
And, this average fells to 3% if only UP adults are considered (US Department of Health 
and Human Services, 1998). In addition, our result is consistent with the fact that a fall in 
the unemployment rate might not imply a rise in the share of employed population since a 
fall in the share of active population might completely offset the rise in 1–U. And, if the 
share of employed population remain unchanged, the share of assisted population is more 
likely to remain unchanged despite the fall in U.  
If it is doubtful whether the unemployment rate affects the welfare participation rate, it is 
less doubtful whether federal welfare policy has some influence. To show why, let’s first 
recover the structural shocks to both the welfare participation rate and the unemployment 
rate from 1962 to 2000 using equation  t 0 t v A e = . These are plotted in Figures 4-5 and 
confirm what supposed in Section 2: the last decade may have actually dated several 
negative shocks to both the unemployment rate and the welfare participation rate, the latter 
being consistent with the idea of a restrictive federal welfare policy.  
 
Figure 4 here 
Figure 5 here 
 
Further, a brief review of the effects of previous federal welfare policies may help to better 
understand the experience of the last decade. For instance, the rise in the welfare 
participation rate in the late 1960s may be associated with the ‘unconditional war on 
poverty’ made by President Johnson (Moffitt, 2002). This ‘war’ started with the 
introduction of Food Stamps and Medicaid in 1965. AFDC caseloads were made  
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automatically eligible, rising propensity of poor families to enter the AFDC program. 
Moreover, various political groups - such as the National Welfare Rights Organization - 
encouraged needy families to apply for AFDC benefits, by providing administrative 
assistance. At the same time, the politics of the ‘Great Society’ encouraged States to accept 
more applications. The latter also happened in force of some Supreme Court decisions 
imposing States to eliminate (being at adds with the Social Security Act) several restrictions 
to eligibility, such as residency requirements or the so-called ‘man-in-the-house rule’. In 
addition, in 1967, the Congress decreased the benefit reduction rate from 1 to 0.66 and this 
choice may have affected the welfare participation rate positively since the lower benefit 
reduction rate ended eligibility being restricted to families with income below of the 
guarantee level. 
An additional example on the possible link between share of population on public 
assistance and welfare policy intervention is related to the approval of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1981. The OBRA moved the benefit reduction rate from 
0.66 to 1. In addition, the act introduced a federal income-limit for eligibility and included 
the eventual stepparent’s income in calculation of total family income. It seems likely that 
the sum of all these changes caused the recipients to decrease from 11.1 millions in 1981 to 
10.4 millions in 1982, the highest decline since AFDC birth.  
An increase in the welfare participation rate was also registered in the early 1990s. This 
increase can be - at least partly - related to the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA). This act 
made mandatory the participation in the AFDC-UP program for every State receiving 
matching grants. The FSA had transitory rules for those States not yet offering AFDC-UP, 
with the transition period expiring on October 1990. Indeed, the number of States offering 
AFDC-UP jumped from 28 in 1990 to 52 in 1991. Further, the FSA made mandatory the 
State medical assistance for AFDC families, rising propensity of poor to apply for benefits.   
To conclude, the first stylized fact and some additional arguments presented so far make 
hard to believe that the decline in the welfare participation rate since its 1994 peak was 
mainly due to the decline in the unemployment rate, as the majority view suggests (Bell, 
2001). On the contrary, the fall in the welfare participation rate since its 1994 peak can be 
mainly attributed to the restrictive welfare reforms occurred, under the assumption that the 
literature is right in considering two main explanations for this fall.  
Regarding our second VAR stylized fact (Section5), it is consistent with findings of several 
welfare-to-work studies (Section 2). Our result supports the idea that a federal political 
choice to contract (expand) the welfare participation rate may reduce (increase) the 
unemployment rate. The next Section is aimed to discuss theoretical issues behind this 
result. We also wonder whether the reduction in the welfare participation rate, mainly due 
to a political choice, has affected the reduction of the unemployment rate in the 1990s. 
 
 
8. Has the fall in the welfare participation rate inflated the fall in the 
unemployment rate? 
 
The idea that the number of welfare caseloads can affect the official unemployment level is 
not new in the economic theory. It is associated, at least since 1937, with the concept of 
disguised unemployment introduced by Joan Robinson (1980). Disguised unemployment 
can be defined as the number of people holding peripheral jobs in an economy, i.e. jobs 
paying a very low hourly wage. In Robinson’s view, total employment in an economy is 
given by the sum of regular employment, say R, and disguised unemployment, say D. The 
latter is highly affected by the number of people willing to do peripheral jobs. Indeed, D  
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can be lower than its potential level determined by the effective demand, while this is less 
likely to happen for R. The basic idea is the following: if public assistance allows more 
people to survive without doing peripheral jobs, then less people will be willing to do such 
jobs. Therefore, disguised unemployment could be lower than its potential level and official 
unemployment might be higher than its potential level. Formally, one could argue that R is 
always equal to the number of non-peripheral jobs available (determined by the effective 
demand), while D is the minimum between the number of peripheral jobs available, say Y 
(determined by the effective demand), and the number of people willing to do peripheral 
jobs, say X (negatively affected the number of people on public assistance). Then, if there is 
an excess of Y over X, a fall in the number of people on welfare rolls increases the level of 
disguised unemployment (see also Eatwell, 1995).    
The economic expansion since 1993 has increased both non-peripheral and peripheral job 
opportunities. The decrease in the number of caseloads, mainly due to a federal political 
choice, has likely increased the number of people willing to accept peripheral jobs. The 
combination of this two events may have increased the level of disguised unemployment. 
The increase would have been lower in absence of the welfare reforms, as the increase in 
peripheral job opportunities would have been followed by a lower increase in the number 
of people willing to do those jobs. This kind of reasoning suggests that the fall in the 
welfare participation rate since its 1994 peak, mainly due to the welfare reforms, may have 
inflated the fall in the unemployment rate in the 1990s, by increasing employment 
proportionally more than labor force. Our second stylized fact supports this conclusion. In 
addition, Boushey and Rosnick (2003) have shown that most welfare leavers have found 
jobs in low-wage industries of retail commerce and services, and that six of the top nine 
industries hiring former welfare recipients - food service, temporary help, home health 
care, nursing and residential care, local government teaching, and child care - have grown 
faster than total employment between 1996 and 2000. 
The finding that B is not a strong predictor of U (p-value 0.08) is consistent with the fact 
that, theoretically, a change in the number of people on welfare rolls, that affects X, may or 
may not affect D. For instance, a reduction in the number of people on welfare rolls, 
increasing X from X(0) to X(1), does not increase D if Y(0) is not higher than X(0). In 
other words, it is consistent with the Keynesian view that maximum potential total 





The Council of Economic Advisers (1997) started a large research effort about the 
relationship between the US unemployment rate and the welfare participation rate, with 
special regard to the 1990s. We have examined this relationship in a structural VAR model 
over the period of 1960-2000. In our findings, the unemployment rate does not help to 
predict the welfare participation rate, while the converse is true. Moreover, an exogenous 
negative shock to the welfare participation rate predicts a reduction in the unemployment 
rate. These results are robust to State and year heterogeneity over the period of 1990-1998. 
A first implication is that - contrarily to the majority view - the decline of the welfare 
participation rate in the last decade should be mainly attributed to restrictive welfare 
reforms, not to the fall in the unemployment rate. Further, the political choice to reduce 
the welfare participation rate may have inflated the reduction in the unemployment rate. 
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Appendix  
 
The low dimension of the VAR negatively affects generality of our study. Indeed we 
believe that our empirical model is far from being exhaustive. A higher number of 
variables might lead to different empirical results (or might not). This, however, will not 
affect our main point: that is, the importance of modeling somehow the dynamic 
interaction between the unemployment rate and the welfare participation rate. Indeed, our 
article has the additional aim to question the validity of the single-equation approach in the 
literature. Future research to improve our VAR specification is needed and welcome.   
Each time-series used in Model 1, namely U and B, has 41 annual observations. Since 
Model 1 has required estimation of 10 parameters, the number of observations might be a 
source of distortion. However, results of Model 1 are not rejected using a panel of 51×9 
observations (Model 2). 
Another criticism may be related to the use of the national time-series themselves, 
independently of the number of observations. Since the AFDC-TANF is a State level 
program, the use of national time-series data may mask important heterogeneity at State 
level. Nevertheless, a time-series approach have at least two advantages. First, it allows to 
recover actual structural shocks to the national welfare participation rate, which are of 
some interest since suitable to be interpreted as federal welfare-policy shocks. Second, it 
easily allows to keep into account data on the share of population on welfare rolls in the 
period of 1960-1975, disregarded since the first CEA (1997) report. Moreover, although 
very simple, Model 1 provides a reasonable fit of actual data regarding the AFDC-TANF 
participation rate (Figure 1).  
Another note is related to our identification method. As well-known, identification of a 
structural model is controversial and it is uneasy to make the right choice. Our choice of a 
relatively simple method is mainly due to the lack of a formal U-B theory, supporting a 
more complex identification method. Indeed, this paper has also the aim of ‘letting data 
speak’ in order to derive stylized facts that may be modeled by other researchers. As 
stressed in Section 4, our ordering is justified by the existing literature that primarily 
underlines the influence of U on B. Therefore, the literature’s agreement on the influence 
of U on B is criticized by our first stylized fact, under a non-favorable initial assumption. 
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Table 1 
 











Unit root  Stationarity 
Test statistic for U   
 
–2.42 0.19 




Critical value at 1% 
 
–2.62 0.73 
Critical value at 5% 
 
–1.94 0.46 
Critical value at 10%  –1.61  0.34 
 
Notes 
Sample period of 1960-2000. 
ERS = Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). 
KPSS = Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992). 
ERS tests assume intercept and one lagged difference.  
KPSS tests assume intercept only. 
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Significant at 1% level *. Significant at 5% level **. Significant at 10% level ***.  
Columns (a)-(b):  
Autocorrelogram analysis shows that residuals are not auto-correlated. White’s test does not reject to null 
of homoschedasticity in residuals. Jerque-Bera test rejects the null of normality for residuals of column (a). 
Multicollinearity might affect B’s estimates in column (a) due to high linear correlation (r = 0.95; p-value = 
0.00). If either B(–1) or B(–2) is removed from the regression model, the estimated effect of B on U is 
significant at 5% and approximately equal to the sum of B’s coefficients in column (a), and residual test 
outcomes are the same as for column (a).  
Columns (c)-(d): 
Windmeijer (2000) corrected standard errors are computed. 
 
Selected p-values  (c)  (d) 
Hansen test of over identifying restrictions   0.43  0.50 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences   0.00  0.03 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences  















Column index  (a) 
 
(b) (c) (d) 
Dependent variable   U 
 
B U B 
Instruments option  No 
 
No t–2 t–3 
State and year effects 
 
No No Yes Yes 
















































F-stat. P-value F-stat P-value 
U does not Granger cause B 
 





B does not Granger cause U 
 
2.59 0.08 2.59 0.08 
 
  








































Sample period is of 1990-1998. Year effects are included in all models. OLS does not include State effects. 




Unemployment rate p-values  GMM2 DIFF  GMM2 SYS 
Hansen test of over identifying restrictions   0.07  0.15 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences   0.00  0.00 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences   0.53  0.52 
 
Welfare participation rate p-values  GMM2 DIFF  GMM2 SYS 
Hansen test of over identifying restrictions   0.24  0.28 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences   0.32  0.04 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences   0.13  0.01 
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Figure 1 
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Source: US Department of Health and Human Services <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/stats/6097rf.htm> 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics <http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf>. 
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Figure 4 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 These studies have also discussed the influence of the welfare reforms on the share of population on public 
assistance. 
2 These studies has also discussed the influence of political changes, other than welfare reforms, on 
employment and labor force. 
3 That is, we assume  0 2 1 2 = δ = δ = φ  in equation (7) and  0 2 1 2 = θ = θ = η  in equation (8). Year dummies 
are found jointly significant in both equations. 
4 If the instrument matrix is singular, two-step estimates may be no longer more efficient than one-step. It is 
worth stressing that all the results in this article are not sensitive to use of ‘collapsed’ instruments.  